Trade Secrets & Employee Mobility

On September 12, 2024, the Regional Director of the National Labor Relations Board’s (“NLRB”) Region 22 in Newark, New Jersey, issued an unfair labor practice complaint against a New Jersey building services company, alleging that employee non-hire (or “no poach”) provisions in the company’s contracts with its building clients violate the National Labor Relations Act (the “Act”).

According to the NLRB’s news release, the complaint alleges that Planned Companies D/B/A Planned Building Services, which is a janitorial, building maintenance, and concierge services provider, “has maintained provisions in its contracts with its client buildings that interfere with, and are inherently destructive of, workers’ rights under Sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act.”  It further alleges that “Planned Companies restricts its client buildings from soliciting its employees to work for them in a similar job classification for a period of six months after the agreement is terminated, or from hiring employees after they leave Planned Companies’ employment. Any entity retained by the client building to replace Planned Companies is also bound by the hiring restriction.” 

A hearing before an NLRB Administrative Law Judge has been set for November 12, 2024.

Last summer, as discussed in this blog, the Georgia Court of Appeals issued a decision in N. Amer. Senior Benefits, LLC v. Wimmer that presented potential challenges for employers seeking to enforce employee non-solicitation provisions.  That case held, pursuant to Georgia’s Restrictive Covenants Act, OCGA § 13-8-50 et seq., that a restrictive covenant extending beyond the end of an individual’s employment, and undertaking to prohibit the individual from soliciting former coworkers, is unenforceable if it lacks an explicit geographic limitation. 

In a September 4, 2024 Opinion, the Georgia Supreme Court overruled that decision.  The relevant statutory provision in both cases is OCGA § 13-8-53(a), which permits enforcement of restrictive covenants “so long as such restrictions are reasonable in time, geographic area, and scope of prohibited activities.”  The Supreme Court held that “nothing in the text of subsection (a) mandates that a restrictive covenant contain an explicit geographic term, nor does subsection (a) prohibit a covenant’s geographic area from being expressed in implied terms.”

The Supreme Court continued: “In short, the plain text of subsection (a) requires with respect to geographic restrictions on competition that any such restriction be reasonable, regardless of whether the restriction is expressly stated or implied.”  The Court also noted that its reading of OCGA § 13-8-53(a) comports with the Restrictive Covenants Act’s “more permissive and flexible approach to restrictive covenants.”